IDF Chief Warns of Collapse From Within (Special Edition)

Politically, this makes them a decisive bloc. The Haredim are a major voter base that consistently supports right-wing coalitions, often acting as kingmakers in Israeli politics. However, their alignment is not strictly ideological. Rather than being driven by traditional right-wing nationalism, their voting behaviour is largely transactional—focused on protecting religious interests, securing funding, and maintaining exemptions such as military service. This creates a unique dynamic where they are central to the right’s electoral strength, while not necessarily being fully aligned with its broader ideological agenda.

The Military Strain

If you’ve been a long-time reader, you’ll know we’ve been discussing the operational strain on the Israeli military for quite some time now. When Israel launched its last major push into Gaza—David’s Chariot—right before the ceasefire, there were already significant internal warnings from Eyal Zamir. The core concern was that prolonged urban combat would continue to degrade operational capabilities, regardless of whether tactical objectives were being achieved. Largely driven by war fatigue, the Israeli army has effectively been in continuous conflict since October 2023, and we’re now approaching three years of sustained warfare.

Zamir’s concern is relatively straightforward: the troops are exhausted, and they are being stretched across multiple fronts. They’ve spent years engaged in the most demanding form of combat (urban warfare) while also operating in Syria and Lebanon, and are now pushing into another large-scale operation with the likely objective of occupying southern Lebanon unless a resolution is reached. At the same time, resources are being stretched further by commitments in the West Bank. For example, the IDF has already been forced to divert an infantry battalion originally intended for deployment to Lebanon into the West Bank, as rising settler violence against Palestinians demands increased internal security resources.

War Weariness Does Not Mean Less War Support

This isn’t to say that support for the war isn’t there—quite the contrary. According to recent polling, around 90% of Israelis support the current conflict in Iran. From the Israeli perspective, it is a hardship worth enduring as long as there is a victory over the horizon. This has been shaped heavily by the psychological aftermath of the October 7 attacks, which reinforced a widespread belief among Jewish Israelis that aggressive security measures are necessary for long-term survival. Many view the current conflict through a trade-off lens—short-term suffering, including civilian disruption, casualties, and constant alerts, in exchange for future security.

However, this support does not fully translate into political backing for Benjamin Netanyahu. While polls suggest approval of his handling of the Iran war, many voters remain reluctant to return him to power, reflecting lingering distrust from earlier phases of the Gaza conflict. At the strategic level, Israeli military and intelligence officials are increasingly cautious. Despite tactical successes, there is concern over the absence of a clear long-term strategy, particularly regarding how these gains translate into lasting security. A key worry is the potential damage to Israel’s relationship with the United States (a cornerstone of its security architecture), raising the risk that even battlefield successes could evolve into long-term strategic setbacks. If you’re wondering why this is the case, it’s because Israel may be one of the only countries where polling shows strong support for this war—for instance, over 60% of Americans do not support it. Polling Source

Disconnect between Netanyahu and Intelligence / Military Apparatus

So when we see repeated comments from the IDF Chief about war weariness, it’s coming from a logical assessment by someone who understands the realities and limits of sustained conflict—unlike politicians (who would’ve thought). Put yourself in the shoes of the IDF: there is an ongoing occupation force in large parts of Gaza, a conflict that is still not fully resolved. There is also an active presence in Syria—supporting the Druze while operating on contested ground, which has already led to casualties. Now, on top of that, we’re seeing a major operation into southern Lebanon against an adversary that has spent decades preparing for exactly this scenario. Again, this isn’t a “doomer” viewpoint—it’s an objective assessment of the operational load being placed on the military. And there may be a broader disconnect between Benjamin Netanyahu’s political cabinet and the intelligence and military establishment; for example, Mossad reportedly refused to carry out an operation targeting Hamas officials in Qatar, citing the wider strategic and diplomatic risks involved. That was a major eye opener for me when I first read the report, and in hindsight the intelligence apparatus was correct. Qatar has managed to slip out from this war whilst mending relations with Iran. Sources available upon request